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BURUNDI :
ONE HUNDRED DAYS TO PUT THE PEACE PROCESS BACK ON TRACK
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The deadlock in the Burundi peace process has
finally been broken. On 23 July in Arusha, Nelson
Mandela’s choice of Pierre Buyoya and Domitien
Ndayizeye as president and vice-president of
Burundi for the first phase of transition was
endorsed at a summit of regional heads of state.
Buyoya and Ndayizeye also agreed to fulfil eleven
conditions guaranteeing the full implementation of
the Arusha agreement of 28 August 2000. The
three-year transition period will start on 1
November 2001. In the absence of a ceasefire, the
implementation of the Arusha agreement will not
be backed up by a UN peacekeeping force.
However a special Burundian protection force is
foreseen to facilitate the return of exiled political
leaders.  Half of the force will be picked from
members of the Tutsi-dominated army; the parties
representing Hutu interests will choose the other
half.
The political compromise endorsed in Arusha is
the result of a change in approach by the Mandela
facilitation team. This time priority was given to
the negotiations between Pierre Buyoya’s Union
pour le progrès national (Union for national
progress, UPRONA) and Jean Minani’s Front pour
la démocratie au Burundi (Front for Democracy in
Burundi, FRODEBU), which must now become
the driving forces of the peace process. The
previous cycle of negotiations, based on the fiction
of discussions between nineteen equal parties, is
finally over. The key transition partners, UPRONA
and FRODEBU, must face their responsibilities.
The success of the transition will depend on their
cooperation. And with the issue of the transitional
leadership finally sorted out, the negotiators will
have no choice but to focus on the central issue of
the peace process: the reform of the armed forces.
Up to now, despite regional and international
mobilisation on the issue of a ceasefire, the armed
groups have given no tangible sign of willingness
to negotiate within the Arusha framework. The
latest ceasefire negotiations, which took place in
Pretoria on 25 and 26 July between the government
and the Conseil national pour la défense de la
démocratie-Forces de défense de la démocratie
(CNDD-FDD), were a failure. The CNDD-FDD
rejected the Arusha agreement, criticised the South
African facilitation team for being biased, and
demanded the appointment of a French-speaking
co-mediator. The Parti pour la libération du
peuple hutu-Forces nationales de libération
(PALIPEHUTU-FNL) also seems uninterested in
the implementation of the Arusha agreement,
simply reiterating its own negotiating conditions.
The ceasefire negotiations are also FRODEBU’s
responsibility. The credibility of its leadership of
the Hutu political family and its capacity to lead
the transition successfully are dependent on it. But
the burden of obtaining a ceasefire cannot rest on
FRODEBU alone.  It is high time to seek a more
suitable and productive formula for the
negotiations. Failure carries too many risks for the
future of the transition. The coup attempt of 22
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July, (the second in just over three months), is a
clear warning to Pierre Buyoya: in the absence of
ceasefire, the political choices made in Arusha
frighten the army and the Tutsi community in
general. Some of its members are ready to stop the
peace process dead.
The hundred days from 23 July to 1 November are
therefore pivotal for the Burundi peace process.
These hundred days will lay the foundations of the
coming transition period. They must produce
sufficient confidence in the peace process to ease
fears and reduce hostility. At this point, it is crucial
that all political actors, national, regional and
international, show unambiguous support for
putting the peace process back on track. The coup-
plotters must be strongly discouraged, and the
necessary pressures must be applied to bring the
rebels back to the negotiating table. Burundi’s
donors must also keep the promises of financial
support made at the Paris conference of December
2000. By 1 November 2001, Burundi’s population
must have regained hope that peace is possible,
and begin to feel the economic and social benefits
to be gained from the implementation of the
Arusha agreement. All these efforts must get
underway now, so that at the end of the hundred
days, a brighter future is in sight for Burundi.
RECOMMENDATIONS
TO THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY
COUNCIL
1. Vigorously condemn any coup attempts and
warn that sanctions will be applied to future
coup plotters or those who attempt political
assassination. Treat the culprits as
international criminals, begin legal
proceedings against them and freeze their
financial assets overseas.
2. Support the creation of a peacekeeping force,
ready to intervene as soon as a ceasefire has
been declared. Prepare its administrative and
operational set-up, develop different options
for its concept of operations, the details of its
mission, and the terms and location of
deployments (especially on the Tanzanian
border, Lake Tanganyika, and on the Rusizi
plain).
3. Maintain pressure on the Democratic
Republic of Congo, and discussions with
Tanzania, to end all external support for
armed groups.
TO BURUNDI’S DONORS
4. Make available immediately U.S.$100
million of the U.S.$440 million promised at
the Paris conference of December 2000 for
the implementation of the Arusha Peace
Agreement, and give the transition
government a period of grace. These funds
must support the rapid creation of various
technical commissions for the repatriation of
refugees and the resettlement of internally
displaced persons. They should also support
economic production, and ease access to
foreign currency to promote rapid reductions
in the cost of food and basic goods.
5. Generously support the creation of a special
Burundian force to protect the institutions of
transition and political leaders returned from
exile, making the force an example of what
to expect from future reform of the security
services. If necessary, offer complementary
accelerated training programs to Hutu
officers who participate in the joint
command structure.
TO THE MEMBERS OF THE REGIONAL
INITIATIVE FOR BURUNDI (UGANDA,
RWANDA, TANZANIA AND THE DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF CONGO AMONG OTHERS).
6. Give unambiguous support to the full
implementation of the Arusha agreement if
August 2000 and the results of the 23 July
2001 summit, and support the creation of a
united front against the rebels if by 1
November significant ceasefire negotiations
have not begun. Equally, warn Tutsi
opponents of the Arusha and Pretoria
agreements that no support for coup attempts
will be tolerated.
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TO NELSON MANDELA AND THE
FACILITATION TEAM.
7. Open an office in Bujumbura and launch a
major information campaign to explain the
peace agreement, in order to avoid
speculation and prevent manipulation of
public opinion. The distribution of the
written agreement is not enough. Members of
the facilitation team must tour the country to
explain the agreement orally, and arrange
regular radio broadcasts about the agreement
in local languages.
8. Open discreet channels of communication
with the rebels, including in the field.
9. Appoint a permanent team of professional
negotiators devoted to the ceasefire
negotiations, which can work to build
confidence with the rebel groups.
10. Give guarantees of confidentiality, discretion
and amnesty to rebels who are prepared to
negotiate.
11. Do not deal separately with the CNDD-FDD
and the PALIPEHUTU-FNL.
12. Ask the rebels to declare a truce to give the
transition government a chance to impose
significant reforms on the Tutsi extremists.
TO THE FUTURE GOVERNMENT OF
TRANSITION
13. Avoid hostile statements and work towards
building mutual trust. Disqualify any party
leader guilty of defamation or incitement to
ethnic hatred from joining the transition
government.
14. Provide all means necessary to guarantee the
security and encourage the return of exiled
political leaders.
15. Establish a system to receive fighters who
are willing to put down their weapons and
offer training and professional reintegration
programmes. Launch a national information
campaign offering integration into the army




ONE HUNDRED DAYS TO PUT THE PEACE PROCESS BACK ON TRACK
I. INTRODUCTION
On 23 July in Arusha, the Heads of State of the
Regional Initiative for Burundi endorsed the
formula proposed by the facilitator Nelson
Mandela to settle the issue of the transitional
leadership, an issue that had remained unresolved
since the peace agreement was signed in August
2000. According to this formula, Pierre Buyoya
was named as President for the first eighteen
months of the transition and Domitien Ndayizeye,
the candidate of the group of seven parties
representing the interests of the Hutu population
(G7), Vice-President. For the second eighteen-
month period, the President will be chosen from
the G7 and the Vice-President will be appointed
from amongst the ten parties representing the
interests of the Tutsi community (G10). At the
same time, both men reaffirmed their commitment
to implementing the Arusha Agreement of 28
August 2000 by signing, before President
Museveni, a text containing eleven conditions
attached to their appointment.  The start of the
transition period was set for 1 November, leaving
one hundred days for the mediation team to obtain
a truce and set in motion the negotiations for a
permanent end to the hostilities, and one hundred
days for the Burundian Government, Parliament
and other signatories of the Arusha Agreement to
find a solution to the issues that would allow the
transition period to start in earnest (voting for the
preliminary laws specified in the agreement,
setting-up of a force to protect the transitional
institutions made up of members chosen by the G7
and by the government in equal shares and drafting
of a full and precise constitutional text describing
the operation of the transitional institutions).
II. THE AGREEMENT OF 23 JULY:
THE END OF THE ARUSHA CYCLE
A. PRIORITY GIVEN TO UPRONA-
FRODEBU NEGOTIATIONS
The political agreement obtained on 23 July is the
result of a radical change in approach by the
Mandela facilitation team. Following the failure of
the numerous talks held with all of the signatory
parties after it was announced at the Arusha
summit of 28 February that the transition would be
split into two periods of eighteen months, Nelson
Mandela decided to embark upon direct
negotiations between the Union pour le Progrès
National (UPRONA) and the Front pour la
Démocratie au Burundi (FRODEBU), with each
assuming the responsibility for having these
choices accepted by their political “families” and
of becoming once again the driving forces behind
the peace process.
This decision came about after considerable
prevarication. Right up to the middle of June,
FRODEBU had still not accepted the candidacy of
Pierre Buyoya and even implied to the negotiating
team that it had reached an agreement with
UPRONA for a third way (neither Epitace
Bayaganakandi, the candidate of the group of six
Tutsi parties opposed to the renewal of the current
Head of State (G6), nor Pierre Buyoya, but a third
compromise candidate)1. In the end, it was the
support of a delegation from the high command of
the army, which had travelled to Pretoria at the end
of June, which enabled Pierre Buyoya to win the
nomination. After considerable deliberation,
                                        
1 ICG interview with members of the G7 and the
Government, Arusha, 21-22 July 2001.
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Nelson Mandela came out in favour of him.
FRODEBU finally relented, but on 29 June gave
the facilitator a list of conditions and guarantees
relating to the acceptance of Pierre Buyoya's
appointment by the G72.
This list of seventeen conditions and guarantees
was the inspiration for the text signed in Arusha by
Pierre Buyoya and Domitien Ndayizeye in the
presence of Yoweri Museveni: in the end reduced
to eleven conditions, presented to Pierre Buyoya in
Pretoria on 10 July, which he accepted without
hesitation3. Strengthened by this political
agreement, Nelson Mandela managed to have this
choice accepted by the regional Heads of State in
Lusaka, on 11 July, with the support of the Libyan
Head of State Moamar al Gaddafi, who had come
to the aid of Pierre Buyoya in overcoming
Tanzanian hostility4. In the end, the Arusha
summit simply confirmed the decision to set the
agenda and the timetable of the transition, made in
Lusaka twelve days earlier following consultation
with the other signatories.
Two days of talks were therefore offered to the
other signatories of the Arusha Agreement in order
to agree upon the conditions and procedures for
setting up the transitional government, but to no
avail. Four parties of the G6 (Nicéphore
Ndimurukundo's Parti Indépendant des
Travailleurs (PIT), Alphonse Rugambarara's
Mouvement Socialiste Panafricain (MSP)-Inkinzo,
Joseph Nzeyimana's Rassemblement pour la
Démocratie et le Développement Economique et
Social (RADDES), and André Ntadikidje's
Alliance Nationale pour la Démocratie et le
Développement (ANADDE) firstly decided to
boycott the meeting in protest at the Pretoria
Agreement which imposed Pierre Buyoya as the
G10 candidate, and appointed Mathias Hitimana of
the Parti pour la Réconciliation du Peuple (PRP) to
represent them in Arusha. Three days before the
summit, they also held an organised closure of
shops and businesses in Bujumbura as a sign of
defiance against the Pretoria Agreement. But in the
face of the total failure of their attempt to mobilise
                                        
2 Cf. "G7 memorandum containing the conditions and
guarantees in order for the transitional institutions to be
established and be able to work normally", mimeo, 29 June
2001.
3 Cf. IRIN, "Burundi: Decision on transitional leadership
"fixed" Mandela says", 11 July 2001.
4 ICG interview, western diplomats, Arusha, 21-22 July
2001.
the people, and with four members of their
respective parties heading for Tanzania, urged by
the negotiating team to take their places in Arusha,
Alphonse Rugambarara, Joseph Nzeyimana,
Nicéphore Ndimurukundo and Gérard Nigarura,
the Vice-President of ANADDE, finally decided to
take their seats at the negotiating table. In the end,
after a number of further developments, the G10
parties failed to impose other significant conditions
for accepting the Buyoya-Ndayizeye partnership at
the helm of the transition5. Léonard Nyangoma's
Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie
(CNDD) had no greater success, and its proposal,
in particular, to appoint three Vice-Presidents for
the transition, including its candidate, the
Ambassador Albert Mbonerane, and the G6
candidate, Epitace Bayaganakandi, was completely
rejected by the mediator6.
The eleven conditions in any case only serve to
reaffirm the loyalty of their signatories to the
commitments already obtained by the Arusha
Agreement, whilst specifying a number of
important measures for the return of exiled
political leaders. They therefore combine
guarantees on the composition of the transitional
government and the implementation of the Pretoria
Agreement7, a major reaffirmation of loyalty to the
aims and principles expressed in the Arusha
Agreement8 and in particular the measures required
                                        
5 Cf. ABASA, ANADDE, MSP-Inkinzo, PSD, RADDES,
Vert-Intwari, UPRONA, "Guarantees for the establishment
of the transitional institutions and the success of the
transition process", mimeo, 22 July 2001.
6 CNDD, "Conditions for the establishment of the
transitional institutions", mimeo, 22 July 2001.
7 1. Include representatives of the signatory parties in the
transition government (the Arusha Agreement is less
specific, it only stipulates that the choice of government
members be made within the political families represented
by the G7 and G10); 11. End their duties immediately at
the end of the current eighteen-month period with effect
from the date on which the duties were taken up.
8 2. Implement faithfully and unreservedly all the
provisions of the Agreement; 3. as soon as possible, carry
out a reform of the army and take steps to integrate armed
groups and Hutus into the army; 4. co-operate fully with
the representative of the High Commission for Refugees
with regard to the repatriation of refugees and the
rehabilitation of victims; 5. Offer absolute protection to all
political leaders especially those returning from exile; 6.
do not retaliate against political opponents; 7. release
political prisoners on the recommendation of the
international committee to be set up; 9. Work for a fair
representation of Burundian communities in all the offices
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to protect the transitional institutions in the
absence of a cease-fire. One of the concessions
obtained by UPRONA on the question of the
conditions is simply that these conditions should
be binding on both the President and the future
Vice-President.
One of the central guarantees for the
implementation of the agreement, the sending of
UN-commissioned foreign troops, was likewise
stated at this summit but remains suspended due to
the lack of a cease-fire. Foreign troops, which both
signatories undertake to call on in sufficient
number and with which they promise to co-operate
fully for the purposes of maintaining peace and
security, can only be employed after the signing of
a cease-fire in order to guarantee that it is observed
and implemented. Kofi Annan, the Secretary-
General of the United Nations, had made this very
clear to Nelson Mandela. Therefore, in anticipation
of the cease-fire, Pierre Buyoya committed himself
to authorise the formation of a special Burundian
protection unit by 1 November, in order to allow
the return of exiled political leaders and the arrival
of an international workforce to take part in the
Agreement Implementation Monitoring
Committee. This unit, as stated in condition 8,
"must comprise an equal number of Burundian
soldiers/police officers and persons appointed by
the G7. This unit must be under the joint command
of the Burundians and shall be assisted and formed
by the military personnel of the agreed countries".
South Africa, Nigeria, Ghana and Senegal thus
have agreed to supply troops in order to set up a
peacekeeping force under a United Nations
mandate after a cease-fire has been signed. For
setting up the special unit to protect the transitional
institutions, South Africa, in particular, is
anticipating sending military personnel9.
In addition to setting up the special unit to protect
the transitional institutions the joint communiqué
issued at the 15th regional summit on Burundi also
specifies the mission of the foreign force once the
cease-fire has been obtained: (a) guarantee that the
cease-fire is observed; (b) supervise the integration
of armed forces including the return and stationing
of the army in its camps as well as the confinement
of armed groups in special assembly points; (c)
                                                                  
of the civil service; 10. co-operate fully with the
Agreement Implementation Monitoring Committee;
9 ICG interview, Domitien Ndayizeye, Bujumbura, 30 July
2001.
provide technical support to the demobilisation
operation and the formation of the new army.
These troops will be called upon by regional
leaders for deployment as soon as a cease-fire is
signed, pending a meeting of the UN Security
Council to grant the official mandate specified by
the Arusha Agreement. In theory, all they would
then have to do is change berets, putting on the
blue of the United Nations.
Apart from the obvious obstacles that stand in the
way of the aims of the summit of 23 July, (Ghana,
Senegal, South Africa and Nigeria have for
example warned that they would only send their
troops once a mandate has been obtained from the
UN, and not before as the summit requests),
settling the issue of the transitional leadership is a
very significant step for the peace process. This
issue, which has been playing on the minds of the
negotiators for too long, had ended up paralysing
the implementation of the agreement. The change
of methodology proposed by the mediation team,
the priority given to UPRONA and to FRODEBU,
followed by negotiations with the other members
of their political families, has finally put an end to
the confusion of past negotiations, held back by the
rule of partisan consensus.
The procedure is now to seek a sufficient
consensus, initially achieved by an agreement
between the country's two main formations and
negotiated subsequently in their political families.
UPRONA and FRODEBU now have to face up to
their responsibilities and must accept their choices,
both before their respective political families and
before the armed forces and the people.
This formula gives a foretaste of how the
transitional institutions will operate. Gone are the
times of half-hearted commitments declared in
Arusha but denounced as soon as they returned to
Bujumbura. The peace process is now firmly back
on track and caught up by its obligations towards
the country. Finally, the 23 July summit leaves the
field totally clear for cease-fire negotiations.
Again, UPRONA and FRODEBU are required to
mobilise their respective political machines, the
army and their parties, so that the fighters and the
people finally lend their support to a political
solution to the conflict. The ability of Pierre
Buyoya and Domitien Ndayizeye to each prove
their authority over their own camp is the real
political test of the success of the Pretoria
Agreements and the implementation of the
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conditions signed at the summit of 23 July. If
Pierre Buyoya does not manage to persuade the
army to accepts his commitments, and Domitien
Ndayizeye is not able to achieve effective
recognition of his political leadership by the rebels
and the people, leading to a reduction in the
intensity of the conflict or to a truce, the limitations
of the "sufficient consensus" formula will be felt
quickly. The consensus risks being shown to be
insufficient and the implementation of the peace
agreement may be once again crippled by the
demands of other signatories.
B. THE STAKES SET ON 23 JULY
1. For FRODEBU: Saving  The Gains Made
At Arusha
The political paralysis following the signing of the
Arusha Agreement clearly worked against
FRODEBU. In the absence of the implementation
of the agreement and real political dynamism to
give the people and the international community
hope of seeing an end to the conflict within a
reasonable time, the Hutu rebels and their demands
once again dominated the peace process.
Furthermore, the fear that Nelson Mandela would
withdraw, thereby depriving the process of his
moral authority, risked undermining FRODEBU's
chances of returning to power in good condition.
The best it could have expected in this case was a
consolidation of the partnership government and
the permanent installation of Jean Minani in Dar
Es-Salaam! Breaking the deadlock was the
essential condition for FRODEBU keeping its
position as undisputed leader of Hutu interests.
The price to pay, namely, accepting Pierre Buyoya
as President for the first eighteen months of the
transition, although difficult and risky, was in the
end better than seeing the rebels assume political
leadership of the Hutu people. With Domitien
Ndayizeye as Vice-President of the transition,
FRODEBU is still involved and in the end will just
have to learn patience, strengthened by the support
of the entire region on the issue of Pierre Buyoya's
departure, with Yoweri Museveni also having
signed the declaration of 23 July. On 1 May 2003,
the Presidency of the Republic should fall back
into the hands of FRODEBU, the end result of six
years of negotiations. Finally, its return to power
should be enough to contain the internal divisions
undermining the party and to reunite it around
Domitien Ndayizeye and Jean Minani. Both men
now hold the keys to several hundred posts within
the State apparatus with which to appease the
ambitious and the discontented. Conversely, if the
establishment of the institutions is checked and the
promises not kept, both men will most certainly
pay a heavy price.
2. For Pierre Buyoya: The End Of "Neither
Peace Nor War"?
By 1 May 2003, Pierre Buyoya will have gained at
least partial recognition for the reasons behind his
return to power in 1996. FRODEBU can no longer
resort to double speak about achieving a political
solution to the conflict; it is its duty to implement
the Arusha Agreement in order to return to power
and mobilise the people against the rebels.
However, firstly, the Arusha Agreement was in
itself a political victory for the Head of State: Tutsi
interests are widely protected and over-represented
in comparison with the result of the June 1993
elections. It is an agreement that guarantees a
democratic restoration of power in favour of the
Tutsi community10. And secondly, should
FRODEBU not manage to fulfil its pledges,
namely to make a major contribution towards the
achievement of a truce and the opening of
negotiations, the region has committed itself to
waging war against the rebels. Furthermore,
FRODEBU would be weakened and would offer
less resistance to UPRONA.
Indeed, the unwritten intention of 23 July was to
give the Pretoria and Libreville negotiations a last
chance, before taking more forceful action against
the rebels11. In which case, the Burundian army as
a unit would be in a much stronger position to
negotiate a cease-fire and the reform of the armed
forces. Even if these negotiations are not
completed at the end of the first eighteen months
of the transition, Buyoya will have put the peace
process back on track, and significantly
strengthened the negotiating positions of his
political rank and file, the Tutsi community and the
army. With regard to the political and military
oligarchy of Bururi of which he is a key figure, he
has the time and means to preserve its interests, by
                                        
10 Cf. ICG, Burundi: Neither war nor peace. An evaluation
of the peace process after the signing of the Arusha
Agreement of 28 August 2000, Central Africa Report n°25,
1 December 2000.
11 ICG interview, Pierre Buyoya, Bujumbura, 3 August
2001.
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burying the evidence of its economic and financial
omnipotence in renewed flows of international aid,
and by negotiating immunity with FRODEBU. To
his credit, the determination with which the Head
of State is this time campaigning for the full and
complete implementation of the Arusha Agreement
within the armed forces should be highlighted. His
language is now unambiguous, very different from
the usual "neither war nor peace". For the time
being, Pierre Buyoya seems to have taken the main
gamble of the transition. He will therefore be able
to leave power with his head held high, having
finally fulfilled his mission. His success has
already prompted UPRONA's total reversal on the
issue of the transition because with Pierre Buyoya
at the helm, UPRONA is no longer making a
cease-fire a prior condition for the implementation
of the agreement.
3. For The Region: Tanzania Must Face Up
To Its Responsibilities
For several months now, the South African
mediation team has come out in favour of much
more forceful regional action against the rebels, as
well as the mobilisation of a peace enforcement
unit in Burundi. Kigali and Kampala have already
been won over by this option. In light of Kenya’s
indifference, which is only concerned with
protecting its commercial interests in the region
and its access to the Burundian market, Tanzania
remains the main opponent of this option. From
Lusaka to Arusha, and after making a regional tour
in June with the aim of opposing the choice of
Pierre Buyoya as leader of the transition, President
Mkapa remains the most hostile to the Burundian
Head of State, refusing to punish rebels who, in his
opinion, "are defending a just cause".
However, Tanzania's strategic interests weigh
heavily in favour of a rapid solution to the
Burundian conflict:
1) Tanzania is desperate to see Pierre Buyoya
leave power: the agreement of 23 July offers
a specific date for this to be realised: 1 May
2003 - a decision which also involved
Yoweri Museveni, the President of the
Regional Initiative for Burundi.
2) Tanzania is desperate to see the 450,000
Burundian refugees leave its land: the
agreement of 23 July offers guarantees on
this.
3) Tanzania is desperate to see FRODEBU
return to power and Burundi join the East
African Community to the major advantage
of Tanzanian businessmen: once again, the
agreement of 23 July clearly provides for this
possibility.
Consequently, just like FRODEBU, Tanzania has
little choice but to accept it and in particular must
adhere to the strategy conceived by Julius Nyerere
to resolve the Burundian conflict. Now that a
political agreement has been negotiated in Arusha
allowing FRODEBU to return to power,
Tanzania’s passive support for the rebels, which
has acted as a safety lever to maintain pressure on
the Burundian government, has become counter-
productive. The Burundian government must be
given as little room for manœuvre as possible and
not be offered the excuse of continued fighting in
order not to avoid its commitments. Similarly,
FRODEBU's credibility as the driving force behind
the transition and the implementation of the
Arusha Agreement must be consolidated, by
forcing the rebels to enter into negotiations.
Logically, Tanzania should now encourage the
rebels to enter into cease-fire talks and then help
with the operation to secure the border between
Tanzania and Burundi12.
Furthermore, in relation to Uganda and Rwanda,
the time-frame adopted in Arusha perfectly suits
their Congolese strategy. On 1 November, the
international community will have a precise idea of
the constraints of the Lusaka Agreement. The
Inter-Congolese dialogue, for which a preliminary
meeting of the signatories is scheduled for 20
August in Gaborone, will have shown what it is
capable of delivering. Tanzania's involvement in
the stabilisation of Burundi should reduce the
potential trouble-making of the FDD in the Kivu.
Tanzania could even become involved much more
actively in the military stabilisation of the entire
Great Lakes region. The Congolese government
would lose a major ally, and the eastern regional
coalition would gain a degree of legitimacy.
Finally, the political agreement of 23 July depends
on one essential condition for success: all the
signatories (Pierre Buyoya, Domitien Ndayizeye
and the region) must be able to come out of it with
something. And although a certain degree of
                                        
12 It seems moreover that this is already the case,
particularly in Muyinga. Cf. Radio Burundi, "Burundi,
Tanzanian officials agree to tighten security along
common border", broadcast by BBC monitoring, 4 August
2001
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optimism is justified, major challenges face
Burundi's political figures during the course of the
one hundred days between the Arusha Summit and
the start of the transition period, and every effort
must be made to enable them to meet these
challenges.
III. THE CHALLENGES TO BE TAKEN
UP BY 1 NOVEMBER
A. IMPLEMENTING THE DECISIONS OF 10
AND 23 JULY
1. Protecting The Institutions Of Transition
The establishment of a Burundian protection force,
mentioned in the 11 conditions, is essential.
Without it, exiled political leaders cannot return
and the transitional government cannot be formed.
Furthermore, the setting-up of this force, made up
half and half by Hutu soldiers and Tutsis, will
represent an excellent experiment for the reform of
the armed forces. It will enable the importance of
this operation to be played down within the
Burundian armed forces, and will show the troops
and the officers that this reform is possible.
Secondly, it offers the G7 an excellent opportunity
to prove its ability to negotiate in the interests of
Hutu fighters: putting additional pressure, from
below, on the rebel groups outside the process. On
paper, setting up this force should not pose a
problem. FRODEBU and the government
unequivocally support the principle of its
formation13. Two challenges exist however: time
and the choice of men.
The government and FRODEBU have only three
months to agree upon specific terms and conditions
including 1. The establishment of a precise
organisation and operation chart, including a clear
identification of the political authority to which
this unit is answerable and clarification of the
principle of its day-to-day relations with the
Burundian armed forces and the rebels; 2.
Selection of members according to undisputed
procedures; 3. Formation; 4. Deployment.
Judge Mark Bomani of the Tanzanian facilitation
team, Nicholas Haysom, representing Nelson
Mandela, and Ambassador Berhanu Dinka, the
Special Representative of the United Nations
Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region and
Chairman of the Implementation Monitoring
Committee, were appointed by the Regional Heads
of State to facilitate the establishment of this
force14. But by 1 August there was nothing to
                                        
13 ICG interview, members of FRODEBU and UPRONA,
Bujumbura, 30-31 July 2001.
14 ICG interview, UN diplomat, Nairobi, 28 July 2001.
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suggest that the necessary talks had started. Even if
this force is formed gradually, comprising initially
1,000 men, ending up with a unit of some 10,000,
the countdown has already started and time is very
much against the peace process. Given that this
force must be ready and deployed at least a
fortnight before the start of the transition, and that
it will take at least six to eight weeks for it to be set
up, this means that the negotiations on the
organisation chart, operating procedures, selection
procedure and the selection itself must be
completed by 1 September. It is essential that the
members of the government and of FRODEBU, as
well as the team of appointed facilitators, realise
the urgency of the task. Furthermore, the not
inconsiderable issue of the financing of this force
has not been tackled. Although the international
community is likely to be called on for this
purpose, so that the recruitment for the force to
protect the transitional institutions is appealing to
soldiers and police officers from both camps,
urgent measures must be undertaken in this area.
The force must be made up of police officers and
soldiers. As regards the government, the choice of
men should not pose too many problems, although
it seems highly unlikely that FRODEBU will
accept soldiers and officers who are well-known
for previous abuse of power, excessive
politicisation, or links with the intelligence
services.
However the challenge facing FRODEBU is even
more difficult to resolve. Firstly, the Hutu camp
has to produce qualified men who have no
connections with the rebels. But the majority of
Hutu officers who come from the ISCAM [Higher
Institute for Military Officers] or from foreign
military academies have joined the rebels.
Furthermore, Léonard Nyangoma's CNDD, Joseph
Karumba's Front de Libération Nationale
(FROLINA), and Etienne Karatasi's Parti pour la
Libération du Peuple Hutu (PALIPEHUTU) are
the only political and military forces in the G7 to
have signed the Arusha Agreement and are
therefore likely to supply men to this unit. Neither
the fighters of the Conseil National pour la
Défense de la Démocratie-Forces de Défense de la
Démocratie (CNDD-FDD) or the Parti pour la
Libération du Peuple Hutu-Forces Nationales de
Libération (PALIPEHUTU-FNL), or their
respective deserters can be called upon. The former
refuse to acknowledge any legitimacy of the
Arusha Agreements and cannot therefore
reasonably be expected to provide men to protect
its institutions. The latter can only be rehabilitated
as part of a socio-professional retraining
programme. Their recruitment would be a
declaration of war against the rebels, which would
be totally counter-productive when the central
objective of the negotiations is now to obtain a
cease-fire.
Finally, Léonard Nyangoma's CNDD has
disassociated itself from the results obtained on 23
July in Arusha. It states that it does not want any
involvement in the transitional government and is
solely concerned with the cease-fire negotiations15.
Under these circumstances, it is hard to see how it
will provide soldiers for the institution protection
force. Ultimately, FRODEBU can only call upon
FROLINA and PALIPEHUTU, which seems
difficult from an operational point of view, or
choose Hutu policemen, privates and officers who
are already part of the armed forces. This option is
conceivable in the short term, in order to form the
first two battalions that have to be ready by 1
November, but it would be counter-productive
beyond this, precisely proving the G7's inability to
negotiate the reform of the armed forces and the
integration of rebels within it. The only credible
solution in the medium term would be for
FRODEBU to negotiate a modus vivendi within
the transitional institutions with the CNDD. This
challenge is undoubtedly much harder to achieve.
2. The Drafting Of A Clear And Precise Text
Governing The Operation Of The
Transitional Institutions.
The Arusha Agreement of August 2000 does not
specify clearly the distribution of powers between
the various transitional institutions (Government,
President, Vice-President, National Assembly,
Senate) and in the event of conflict, the procedures
to remedy this. The relations between these various
institutions are also not specified. Neither does it
state definitively the exact distribution of seats or
posts within the transition parliament or
government, only referring to proportions16. In
short, the drafting of a clear and precise text
governing the operation of the transitional
institutions is absolutely necessary by 1 November.
                                        
15 Cf. Net Press, "Burundi: Rebel group sets condition for
participation in new government", broadcast by BBC
monitoring, 1 August 2001.
16 Cf. ICG, Neither war nor peace, op. cit.
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Once it has been drafted, it must still be approved
by the Implementation Monitoring Committee, in
which all the signatories have an equal
representation, and then by the National Assembly.
This transitional Constitution is necessary because
it is the only means of avoiding a weak coalition
government, establishing the dictatorship of small
political parties of the "Convention of
Government" type. Domitien Ndayizeye now
agrees with this17. Having personally dug his heels
in on this issue for six months, his final
appointment as Vice-President of the transition and
his likely accession to the Presidency at the end of
the first eighteen months have enabled him to
assess the challenges that he will face in the near
future. Furthermore, the rule by which Buyoya will
relinquish power in 18 months time is not
contained in the agreement and has no legal
validity. Its inclusion in the text governing the
operation of the transition is an additional
guarantee. The revision of this document would
also enable him to remove the ambiguity according
to which it is not the vice-president of the first
period who automatically becomes president of the
second period, but "a G7 representative". From its
point of view, UPRONA could also obtain an
explicit reference in the text to the effect that the
vice-president of the second half of the transition
must come from its ranks. UPRONA had in any
case always pointed out the breaches of the Arusha
Agreement and called for a truly operational text to
be drafted.
An inter-ministerial committee chaired by the
Minister for Human Rights, Eugène Nindorera, has
already prepared a document that could serve as a
basis for concluding the negotiations. FRODEBU
still only challenges the relevance of this document
for reasons within the G7. Although FRODEBU
increasingly acknowledges the need for the
drafting of a clear, precise and operational text, it
does not wish to hear talk of a new transitional
constitution, which would spell the end of its
legitimacy, established in1993 and would be to the
benefit of the CNDD. Besides the need for
Domitien Ndayizeye to save face after six months
of stubbornness, FRODEBU is still hounded by the
CNDD and the CNDD-FDD on the issue of
legitimacy, and does not want to appear as the
destroyer of the 1992 constitution and of the 1993
                                        
17 ICG interview, Domitien Ndayizeye, Bujumbura, 30
July 2001.
popular mandate, which is the main tool for the
mobilisation of the rebellion which broke out in
this period.
The real point of this text is therefore less legal
than political. Legally, the question is easy to
resolve. The Arusha Agreement unequivocally
states that the 1992 constitution is the reference
text for the transition and re-establishes it as the
founding text. Protocol II of the agreement on
"good governance and the institutional
arrangements for transition" amends the 1992
constitution in order to take account of the progress
in political negotiations on the issue of the
transitional institutions. The IMC and the National
Assembly merely have to make a further
constitutional amendment adding to and modifying
the previous one and leading to a clear, precise,
unambiguous text. From a strictly legal point of
view, this would result in a text entitled: "The 1992
Constitution, amended on 1 December 2000, and
amended again on 1 October 2001". This practice
of adapting a legal text to the political situation is
commonplace in all democracies. It only remains
to find the political will to reach a compromise.
Finally, the political negotiation on the sharing of
power, unfinished in Arusha, must be concluded in
Bujumbura between UPRONA and FRODEBU,
and then within the IMC with the other signatories
by 1 November. This negotiation relates to the
distribution of officers within the transitional
institutions and other positions within the State and
is likely to be hard-fought. The G6 has already
made it clear that it would demand the Ministry of
the Interior. Its aim in particular is to be able to
control the running of the post-transitional
electoral campaign, which will surely threaten the
existence of the small parties.
The distribution of posts will in the end be the
biggest test of the new approach to the peace
process. It is UPRONA's and FRODEBU's duty to
be sufficiently responsible to make the concessions
required for this undertaking to be successful,
whilst giving themselves sufficient room for
manoeuvre both to retain the leadership of the
government and to co-opt to their sides the other
members of their political families.
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3. The Laws On Temporary Immunity And
Genocide
Of the five laws that have to be presented by the
Government in order to prepare for the
establishment of the transitional institutions, the
law on temporary immunity and the law on
genocide are the two most difficult texts to adopt.
The texts governing the transitional institutions,
the organisation and operation of political parties
and the establishment of the transitional parliament
are ready, and only need political consent. The two
other bills will be available on 17 August at the
latest18. It is these two texts, however, that are
likely to pose the biggest problem to the peace
process. In practical terms, it is a question of
guaranteeing temporary immunity to political
criminals living inside or outside the country, and
of putting in place specific mechanisms for
fighting against genocide. However, these two
laws are closely connected to the work of the two
committees set up by the Arusha Agreement to
deal with responsibility for war crimes, crimes
against humanity and genocide crimes committed
in Burundi since independence.
Temporary immunity can only, for example, last
the length of time it takes for the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission and the International
Judicial Commission of Inquiry to submit its
results, i.e. two years. At the end of these two
years, the individuals accused must account for
their actions before Burundi's courts. This
therefore also assumes that the reform of the legal
system is completed so that certain criminals
cannot go unpunished, as is the case today. Finally,
this law on temporary immunity poses an obvious
problem of justice. How can this be justified for
political leaders whilst the faceless underlings have
been killed or have been imprisoned for seven
years? It will be necessarily linked to the progress
of national political debate on the question of
amnesty, a politically explosive subject that none
of the signatories of the Arusha Agreement is
prepared to confront at the moment and a subject
that will play a major role in the post-transitional
electoral campaigns.
The Arusha Agreement had not managed to decide
on this matter and a patchwork of institutions has
                                        
18 Iteka news, "The legal technical team hands over three
of the five bills required for the transitional period", 20
July 2001.
been set up designed to satisfy all of the
signatories. The simultaneous recourse, for
example, to a National Truth and Reconciliation
Commission and to an International Judicial
Commission of Inquiry for war crimes, crimes
against humanity and genocide crimes is
contradictory. Specifically, which crime will come
under which process? The first step must be to
identify and qualify it, in the knowledge that
almost all the crimes committed in Burundi and
included in this process are probably politically
motivated crimes. It is necessary to develop this
aspect prudently in order to accompany the change
in mentality. But here too, amendments to the
Arusha Agreement based on political negotiation
will probably be essential in order to make the
transition process coherent and clear.
Ultimately, during the one hundred days preceding
the transition, a question of trust is clearly
incumbent on the signatories of the Arusha
Agreement, and on UPRONA and FRODEBU in
particular. The war continues to fuel mutual
suspicions and to offer an excuse for each party to
renege on its commitments. The eleven conditions
demanded by the G7 in order to accept the
presidency of Pierre Buyoya for the first half of the
transition are clearly a sign of a total lack of trust
in the Head of State, and, conversely, the
conditions that the G10 tried to have adopted in
Arusha for accepting Domitien Ndayizeye as vice-
president for the first half of the transition, were
proof of a similar lack of trust in the opponent.
Epitace Bayaganakandi's nomination was, in the
same vein, the expression of a real defiance from a
section of the Tutsi community towards the Head
of State, which is now expressed through the G6,
describing the Pretoria Agreement and the
outcomes of the Arusha summit of 23 July as "a
fool's deal"19. During these one hundred days, it is
up to the signatories of the agreement and,
especially, Pierre Buyoya and Domitien
Ndayizeye, to clearly show the people that their
respective commitment is not a fool's deal and that
they are now working towards a successful
transition in which, criminals aside, all Burundians
will end up on the winning side. The first challenge
to meet is to work together to bring peace to the
Burundian people.
                                        
19 ICG interview, Alphonse Rugambarara, Bujumbura, 31
July 2001.
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B. CEASE-FIRE: BETTING ON THE NEW
POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT
The implementation of the Arusha Agreement,
signed in August 2000, was dependent on two major
factors: achieving a consensus on the issue of the
post-Arusha transitional leadership and obtaining a
cease-fire.  The first issue is now governed by the
agreement of 23 July. But up until now, despite
international and regional mobilisation on the issue
of the cease-fire, the armed groups have given no
tangible sign of wishing to enter into serious
negotiations. The most recent negotiations on the
cease-fire in Pretoria on 25 and 26 July between the
CNDD-FDD delegation and the government
delegation ended in failure and without a face-to-face
meeting between President Buyoya and the leader of
the FDD.
The FDD's official stance on the peace process, as
voiced by Jean Bosco Ndayikengurikiye at the press
conference that he held on his visit to Brussels on 18
July remains intransigent. According to them, the
Arusha Agreement is a "total failure" because
"Buyoya was negotiating with himself, on the other
side there was nothing"20. The main reason put
forward for this failure was their exclusion from the
Arusha talks since 1998; the only means of
negotiation that they advocate would be a face-to-
face meeting between fighters, following the same
format as the Rome talks between Nyangoma's
CNDD and Buyoya's soldiers in 1997. This time, the
discussions would not be taking place in Rome but in
Libreville, where the CNDD-FDD and army
delegations met twice in January and April 2001
under the auspices of the Gabonese President Omar
Bongo. The FDD indeed reject the South-African
mediation team, which they regard as being biased,
and demand a French-speaking co-mediator.
Their negotiating agenda does not appear to have
changed substantially since the first contacts made
with them by the Mandela Facilitation Team: the
same conditions are reiterated (dismantling of
concentration camps, release of political prisoners,
re-assertion of the 1992 Constitution, reform of the
armed forces21) as being a prerequisite to the
negotiations. However, a number of hesitations and
                                        
20 Jérôme Ndiho, spokesperson of the CNDD-FDD, quoted
in "the Arusha government will change nothing",
Hirondelle Foundation, 24 July 2001.
21 CNDD-FDD, Memorandum sent to the Secretary-
General of the Organisation of African Unity at the
summit of Heads of State held in Lusaka from 9 to 11 July
2001.
contradictions can be found in their stance, which
suggests that the FDD are ready to negotiate.
Firstly, the FDD now accuse Buyoya of not having
honoured his commitments made at Libreville I for
direct negotiation with them, and of having played
several cards between Libreville, Arusha and
Pretoria. Secondly, after having declared on
several occasions that they only wished to
negotiate with a transitional government, they
accuse Arusha of having imposed Buyoya under
the "diktat of the army" and of giving them a
further reason for war. "Mandela has allowed a
mono-ethnic army, which has resisted democracy,
to impose its leader as head of the transitional
government"22. Some accounts confirm that there
is an increasing leaning within the FDD towards
war if "Buyoya were not to leave after 18 months".
Finally, the announcement made on 7 August
regarding the suspension of the Chief of Staff of
the movement, Prime Ngowenubusa, by the head
of military operations, Major Ntigurirwa, sowed
confusion within the movement23. Its official
spokesperson contested the nature of the decision
taken against the Chief of Staff and a further split
may develop within the movement.
The Arusha Agreement seems to be of little interest
to the FNL, who also reiterate their conditions for
negotiation: the dismantling of camps, the release of
political prisoners, the dismantling of militia, the
withdrawal of courts of criminal appeal and the
recognition of PALIPEHUTU-FNL as a political
formation.
Furthermore, the cease-fire negotiations are once
again taking place in a dangerous security situation to
the east of the Congo, Burundi and Rwanda. Since
the CAF offensive on Pepa and Pweto in October
2000, it has become clear that Burundi is the main
target of Hutu armed groups and possibly of the pro-
Kabila alliance, their strategy being to bring the front
towards the interior of the country and to expel
Burundian troops from the Congo. Following this
offensive, which was broken up in full flight by the
                                        
22 Jean Bosco Ndayikengurukiye, interview with RFI
broadcast by BBC monitoring, 30 July 2001.
23 Officially, some heads of domestic military operations
accuse Prime Ngowenubusa of having ordered the
assassination of the head of training, Major Joseph
Nduwayo. The movement's party executives are however
divided on the stance to be adopted on this issue: whether
to confirm the position of the officers in the field or initiate
fair legal proceedings. Cf. communication between ICG
interview with a FDD political adviser, 7 and 13 August
2001.
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APR and RCD with the participation of the
Burundian Armed Forces, the majority of Burundian
troops returned to the Congo. Once again, the
withdrawal of the RCD from the frontline on 15
March and international pressure on the process of
demobilisation, disarmament, rehabilitation and
reinstallation (DDRR) for the armed groups involved
in the Lusaka process led to a movement of these
groups from Katanga towards Lake Tanganyika,
south Kivu and Burundi and resulted in serious
fighting in March / April / May in the south and
centre of the country and in rural Bujumbura.
Military experts suspect that the attacks on Rwanda
by the Rwandan Liberation Army (ALIR I) in June
were probably co-ordinated with attacks on Burundi
and south Kivu. In June there were four main
channels of infiltration: in the North, groups entered
from Kivu into the Kibira forest across the Rusizi
plain and the Imbo region; in the West, others passed
via Lake Tanganyika, in the South (Makamba,
Rutana) and in the East (Muyinga, Kirundo) from
Tanzania. In these provinces, and in rural Bujumbura,
the number of attacks, thefts of cattle and ambushes
has been on the increase for several months.
Currently, there is a slight lull in the fighting but
military intelligence report three FDD brigades that
are said to have remained assembled in south Kivu in
anticipation of a new offensive24.
In the light of the deteriorating security situation and
the acknowledgement of failure in the cease-fire
negotiations up until now, what alternatives are there
for driving forward the peace process? The first is
war. Mandela has already called on several occasions
for a UN Chapter 7 force and for sanctions to be
imposed on the rebels. But no regional or
international player is willing to send troops in a
situation of war. Conversely, once a political
agreement has been signed, the possibility of building
a regional coalition against the rebels is no longer
impossible. A meeting to evaluate this issue is
scheduled to take place in October.
The second alternative is to suppose that the presence
of FRODEBU in power during the transition will be
enough to create the conditions for a change of
attitude from the rebels in relation to the cease-fire
negotiations. FRODEBU must play an active role in
a campaign to mobilise the people in favour of peace,
who ultimately will be the only arbiters of change in
the field. It is in FRODEBU's interest to support this
approach: on 1 November it will switch from the
position of opponent to the position of governor and
                                        
24 ICG interviews, regional military observers, Bujumbura,
29-31 July 2001.
must assume its national responsibilities and work
towards a return to peace. Furthermore, since Buyoya
agreed to sign this transition without a cease-fire, the
responsibility for stopping the war is no longer on his
shoulders alone but also on those of his partner.
Making progress on this issue is essential for building
mutual trust. Up until now, the continuation of the
war fuels mutual suspicion between the two parties.
Buyoya and his camp see violence as a means of
applying external pressure on the negotiations
manipulated by FRODEBU and Tanzania and is
concerned that FRODEBU will return to power to
use state resources and to supply the rebels from the
inside. As for FRODEBU, it accuses its opponent of
demanding a cease-fire in order to prevent
negotiations or the implementation of the agreement
and to maintain the status quo.
It is now a question of preventing the issue of the
cease-fire from becoming an "exit option" for the
implementation of the agreement by the two new
partners. Implicitly, the stance of the Buyoya
government is that presidential power will be passed
over to FRODEBU in 18 months' time if it shows its
commitment to stopping the war. The Defence
Minister said as much on 5 June: "the issue of the
leadership of the transition has changed from being a
political issue into a security issue, since the Hutu
rebel groups refused to subscribe to the Arusha
Agreement".25  In a security situation that has
deteriorated significantly since the spring of 2001, it
is out of the question to bring about changes at the
level of head of the State, which would damage the
cohesion of the army. The same message is indirectly
sent out to Tanzania, giving it a useful reminder of
the commitments that Nyerere had made on this at
the start of the Arusha process. Mwalimu Nyerere's
approach was to foster a political agreement between
Buyoya and FRODEBU and to involve the region in
marginalising those who refused to lay down their
arms. With this approach, the signing of the Arusha
Agreement last August can be seen as being part of a
simultaneous carrot and stick strategy towards
FRODEBU, depending on progress in the cease-fire
negotiations.
The 11 conditions proposed by FRODEBU to the
regional Heads of State in exchange for their
acceptance of Buyoya as President of the first phase
of the transition are an exact replica of the
reservations issued by the Buyoya government on the
Arusha Agreement and reflect the same lack of
                                        
25 Press conference held by the Defence Minister, quoted
by Burundi today, 5 June 2001.
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confidence in its future partner. Here too, by calling
the region to witness this agreement, FRODEBU is
implicitly using the threat of action against the
government if it does not fulfil its commitments,
especially if Buyoya does not leave power after 18
months. Furthermore, exiled FRODEBU leaders have
the means to raise the stakes for returning to the
country. If they do not return, the people will
understand that they do not have confidence in the
agreement.
It is likely that FRODEBU, which has pushed for this
political agreement, is aware that its credibility is at
stake over the issue of the cease-fire. FRODEBU in
no way wants the rebels to hold hostage the outcome
of 5 years of negotiations with Buyoya and for him to
take his privileged place in power. They are therefore
proposing to the FDD and FNL that they leave them
a negotiating space, which would be defined as
follows: 1. Acknowledge that the criticisms made at
Arusha are justified. 2. Expand the agreement, on the
basis of the 1992 constitution, on the reform of the
army, on the peace-keeping force and on the post-
cease-fire transition. FRODEBU is relying on the
formation of the joint unit for the protection of the
institutions to convince several hundred or possibly
several thousand rebels, including those who have
already deserted, that FRODEBU is capable of
negotiating in their interests. The idea is to form a
pilot battalion that can show that the joining together
of army and rebel forces is possible26.
The major obstacle to this plan is naturally the
current split in the Hutu political family. There are
currently three factions in FRODEBU: the external
wing represented by Minani, the two internal groups
represented by the first vice-president and by
Augustin Nzojibwami, who are in competition, not to
mention the struggles for influence between the key
figures that have remained inside Burundi since
1996. In order to reconcile and gather together all the
wings around the transition process, it is essential for
the president of FRODEBU, Jean Minani, to return to
Burundi as a matter of urgency.
In addition, the FDD and FNL show signs of
considerable mistrust towards FRODEBU, who they
see as opportunists cut off from the population and
who have abandoned the fighters since 199627. By
way of example, between July 1996 and October
2000, there was no official meeting at the highest
                                        
26 ICG interviews, members of the FRODEBU,
Bujumbura, 30 July 2001-2 August 2001.
27 ICG interviews, rebel representatives, Bujumbura, 1
August 2001.
level between FRODEBU and the FDD28. Added to
this is the competition of certain civilian members of
the FDD who were formerly in FRODEBU, and
wished to create a political party as a rival to
FRODEBU and to take up political posts. With the
FDD themselves, there seem to be two camps, those
in favour of negotiation and those calling for war.
This internal dissent coincides with those fighting in
Congo and those fighting in Burundi. Finally, the
FNL and FDD are not necessarily in the same block,
which also risks making the cease-fire negotiations
technically complicated.
FRODEBU should certainly not be held solely
responsible for the cease-fire. It is absolutely
essential that a discreet window is left open to
Burundi's FNL and FDD in the negotiation process.
To do this, the mediation team needs to change
methodology. It is firstly essential to switch from an
official, media-covered method to a discreet method.
It should then redefine the protagonists in these
movements, to study the internal hierarchical
structures and the control of the leaders over their
troops and to contact those with influence and who
are able to make quick decisions. If the FDD in the
Congo does not wish to negotiate and is becoming
rich from the war, why not firstly contact those that
are in the field? If a large number of them want to be
demobilised, they must be quickly encouraged to do
so. If some demand confidentiality or immunity
during the negotiations, this must be granted to them.
C. THE TUTSI COMMUNITY AND THE
ARMY: DISPUTED LEADERSHIP AND
STUMBLING BLOCKS
The conditions accepted by Pierre Buyoya on 23
July earned him the animosity of part of the Tutsi
community in Bujumbura, who criticised him for
having signed the agreement without having
previously obtained a cease-fire from the rebels.
Indeed, in negotiating support for his nomination
from the high command of the army and from the
opinion-leaders of the Tutsi community, he had
promised that the cease-fire would be a condition
for the implementation of the Arusha Agreement.
When the conditions imposed on the President
were announced on 23 July, these same leaders
accused him of wanting to preserve his own
                                        
28 The meeting in Majorca held in January 2001 cannot
under any circumstances fit this description. The official
leadership of the FDD was not involved and all the parties
of the G7 except the CNDD were involved.
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position against Tutsi interests. Some of the
conditions that were hard for the leaders to accept
were the release of political prisoners, the
"unreserved" implementation of the agreement29,
the protection of political leaders returning from
exile and the deployment of foreign troops after the
cease-fire.
The two attempted coups of 18 April and 23 July
can be regarded as being serious warning signs for
Buyoya and his ability to guarantee the cohesion of
his camp and, consequently, to impose these
agreements. The first coup involved young
lieutenants from the Military Academy (ISCAM)30,
the second coup involved two battalions
responsible for the security of the capital. One
possible interpretation of the attempted coups is
that they were the expression of a rejection of
Buyoya's nomination for the transition or, at least,
a serious warning that the army's interests could
not be sold off in South Africa. The second attempt
was designed to express disagreement with the
decision made in Lusaka by the mediation team
and the regional heads of state to choose Buyoya
as president for the first half of the transition. It
clearly rejected the explanation given by Mandela
that this choice was supported by the soldiers.
In both attempted coups can be heard the "pareniste"
rank and file disenchanted by the announced return of
FRODEBU to power and the signs of Bagaza's
rallying to Buyoya's transitional power structure. The
disturbing aspect of these attempts is that rumours
had been running for several weeks without any
preventive measures being taken. Furthermore, while
these actions were unfolding, the passive response of
the command and of the unit in charge of the security
of the institutions (USI) was surprising. It does not
appear that there was any serious preparation. Few
officers seemed to want to take responsibility for
stopping the coup plotters when it was time31.
                                        
29 The agreement of 23 July states "implement faithfully
and unreservedly all the provisions of the agreement",
whereas the Arusha Agreement was signed with
reservations by the government. The reservations related
in particular to the lack of a cease-fire.
30 Cf. ICG: Burundi: breaking the deadlock. The urgent
need for a new negotiating framework, Central Africa
Report n°29, 14 May 2001.
31 ICG interviews, officers of the Burundian army,
Bujumbura, 30 July/1-2 August 2001.
The coup of 23 July was the work of two battalions
that form part of the GODEC32. Some 400 soldiers
left their positions around the town and headed
towards Bujumbura where they hoped to overpower
the field officers of the high command perceived to
be responsible for the earlier failed coup in April.
The leader of the GODEC was alerted by a captain
and the head of the police force immediately gave
officers the order to block access to the town by the
Ntahangwa bridge. On arriving at the bridge, the
rebel soldiers exchanged fire with the police officers
killing one soldier and injuring the officer in charge
of the police detachment. The coup plotters then fled
the town, after trying to release from prison those
responsible for the attempted coup in April and
taking a number of officers hostage in the northern
provinces. The day after the attempted coup, they
returned to the Ngozi province where they are
currently being held. The main reason for the coup's
failure was because the garrison towns in southern,
northern and central rural Bujumbura did not support
it33.
Currently, twenty or so officers are under arrest for
their involvement in the two attempts. But their
punishment is the subject of major discussion
within the Tutsi community. In the minds of the
town's Tutsi civilians, it is unfair to punish young
soldiers who wanted to protect the interests of their
community, especially as those in power are
considered by many to have failed to protect the
same community during the massacres of 1993.
After the April coup carried out by officer cadets
of the ISCAM, the academy was closed and the
eight hundred subalterns deployed in several units
of the army spread out across the country. and this
decision was perceived as a punishment. From
their new positions the officer cadets were able to
mobilise the new troops around their resentment34.
A coup in the current climate would be extremely
dangerous, not only for the peace process, but also
for the cohesion of the country. Firstly, these
attempts would probably lead to international
sanctions, or even regional intervention. A soldier
who takes power by force nowadays has not learnt
the lessons of recent years, in particular the
regional embargo imposed on Buyoya in 1996.
There would be no other means of running the
country effectively and war cannot be waged
                                        
32 Groupement Opérationnel pour la défense de la capitale
[Operational Group for the Defence of the Capital].
33 ICG interviews, officers of the Burundian army,
Bujumbura, 30 July/1-2 August 2001.
34 Ibid.
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without money. Secondly, the odds are that such a
coup would divide or even destroy the Burundian
army and its ability to guarantee the defence of the
region. There is a dual risk at this level: one part of
the army could clash with another and the rebels
could take advantage of this weakness. Groups of
extremist soldiers could also decide to eliminate
certain political and military figures seen as the
linchpins of the system in place and trigger off
uncontrolled and violent reactions. Lists of men
involved in the system already circulate in the
capital. They may also decide to attack Hutu
figures in order to provoke public reaction.
However, in a scenario where the town's citizens
are heavily armed, any incident may quickly turn
to carnage.
The army's response to the peace agreement and
the ability of the current leadership to gain the
army's acceptance of the cease-fire and reform
remains the major unknown factor in this process.
Several splits, which have been noticeable for
some time, are now appearing to widen. The first
split is between the senior officers and the privates.
The latter firstly complain that the high command
prevents them from waging all-out war and cite
frequent examples where no order to attack is
given despite the enemy being clearly identified.
Secondly, the privates cannot understand that they
are asked to mobilise against the rebels while at the
same time plans are being made to demobilise
them and to give jobs to those whom they are
fighting. They see themselves as the victims of the
reform of the army, while their officers would
remain in their posts. Deteriorating economic and
social conditions exacerbate their fear of
unemployment. Finally, they reject the Arusha
negotiations, which they consider to be the work of
criminals, "coup plotters and perpetrators of
genocide". When the high command travelled to
South Africa to tell Mandela that the "army"
supported Buyoya, young officers clashed with
their superiors by stating that the army was not in
favour of a man but a national institution35.
This internal split also has a regional dimension.
The nomination of Epitace Bayaganakandi, a
colonel from the Mwaro province (in the centre of
the country), for the transitional leadership
revealed the divisions in the army between the
Bururi officers, greatly dominant and on the whole
favourable to Buyoya, and those of the Mwaro
                                        
35 Ibid.
province, who have the support of the privates,
now predominantly from the centre.
These opinions in the army are relayed to, and
supported by, Tutsi politicians and certain
businessmen from the capital such as PARENA
and the group of small Tutsi parties, the G6, which
opposed Buyoya in Arusha. It was these parties
who negotiated the Convention of Government
with FRODEBU in 1994 and who used their veto
to block the same Convention as well as supplying
Tutsi militia in 1995 and 1996. Similarly, in 1998,
at the Arusha negotiations they attempted to
prevent them from succeeding.
Some of the stumbling blocks observed on the
issue of the leadership of the transition can be
attributed to them as well. In order to oppose
Buyoya, they supported the nomination of Epitace
Bayaganakandi and sided with the G7, made up of
Hutu parties. In Bujumbura, they mobilised the
unions against those in power, and also Tutsi
opinion through organisations such as PA
Amasekanya and AC génocide.  Joining these
associations and the other members of the
"Framework Agreement" is now a group of
politicians and associations of survivors of the
1993 massacres and other Tutsi radicals that was
set up in 2000 in opposition to the Arusha
Agreement36. Indeed, since November 2000, the
G6 and the Framework Agreement have come out
in support of the nomination of Epitace
Bayaganakandi. They have also mobilised the
trading class, predominantly from the centre of the
country. This class made a major contribution to
the financing of the destabilisation of FRODEBU
during the Convention period. On several
occasions, they called for strikes and closures of
local businesses and shops and they are strongly
suspected of involvement in the recent attempted
coups. On the announcement of the Agreement of
23 July, they issued a press release denouncing the
unfair enforcement of Buyoya as leader of the
transition, his "unreserved" acceptance to
implement the agreement, i.e. without a cease-fire,
his approval for the deployment of foreign troops
and his consent for the reform of the army. To
formalise their position, they created a front
against Buyoya, the "Mouvement de Résistance
                                        
36 AC génocide, PA Amasekanya, UPRONA Mukasi,
Jeunesse Révolutionnaire Rwagasore, Coalition pour la
Défense de la Démocratie and the unions are members of
this.
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pour la Réhabilitation du Citoyen" (MRC)
[Resistance Movement for the Rehabilitation of
Citizens], made up of members of the framework
agreement37. However, within this group, despite
its united front against Buyoya, there are a number
of divisions, particularly on the issue of
participation in Arusha, with the G6 being
signatory to the agreement and the other parties
being opposed to the negotiations from the outset.
PARENA also refuses to join the MRC and to
support the nomination of Bayaganakandi. The
problem essentially arises from the personal
competition between Bagaza, the President of
PARENA, and MRC leader Bayaganakandi.
PARENA denounces the transition agreement of
23 July and the dithering of small parties unable to
follow its example of boycotting the signing
ceremony or to give up their post in the future
government. These divisions go some way towards
explaining why the recent calls for strikes and
closures of businesses and shops were not really
heeded by the Tutsi population. It is true that the
Tutsi people are increasingly disappointed with
their politicians whom they accuse of having
played the ethnic card for their own purposes,
namely, access to power and its benefits.
After the attempted coups, the government
suddenly realised the need to explain the peace
process better. The president went to Ngozi to
meet key figures from the northern provinces, the
first vice-president travelled to Gitega and the
second vice-president visited Cibitoke and
Bubanza to explain the next steps, in particular the
cease-fire, and to avoid speculation on the
deployment of foreign troops. UPRONA released
an astonishingly conciliatory press release entitled
"the 11 Arusha conditions, what is there for us to
fear or make us demoralised?" reviewing the 11
conditions and explaining their significance.38
Nevertheless, the influence of these parties and
organisations is a source of concern for the Buyoya
government. Several sympathisers and members of
PARENA have again been arrested in relation to
the inquiry into the attempted coup of 22 July, and
a major security operation prevented PARENA
from organising a protest march in Bujumbura on
11 August. At the end of the day, however, the best
way of defusing the extremists and cutting off the
                                        
37 Press release from the G10 parties, 28 July 2001.
38 Letter from the Central Committee of UPRONA, N°36,
1 August 2001
leaders of the G6 from the members of the
Framework Agreement is probably to offer
representatives of G6 posts in the transitional
government
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IV. CONCLUSION: CREATE TRUST
The peace process in Burundi is now at a turning
point. It has one hundred days to consolidate itself
and to set the transition on a firm footing, guiding
the country irrevocably towards peace. Many
obstacles still stand in the way of the transition,
and the absence of a cease-fire is undoubtedly the
most serious. Every effort must now be made
towards achieving this objective, which alone
could restore to the Burundians confidence in the
ability of their politicians to build a better future
for the country. To achieve this goal, hesitation,
double-dealing and prevarication are no longer
acceptable. All national, regional or international
political players who are involved either closely or
remotely in the resolution of this conflict must give
peace a chance, and only have until 1 November to
prove their credibility to the country.
On a national level, it is up to the signatories to the
Arusha Agreement, and in particular UPRONA
and FRODEBU, to become the driving forces
behind the peace process. They need to show the
army and the rebels that the implementation of the
Arusha Agreement is now the only way ahead,
working together to make it possible and
unambiguously supporting it in all their statements,
actions and deeds. The FRODEBU leader in
particular must have the physical and political
courage to return to the country by 1 November,
and all the UPRONA leaders must work to
encourage the army, its own ranks, and the Tutsi
community as a whole to observe and support the
commitments made by Pierre Buyoya.
On a regional level, the time of ambiguities is now
in the past. Tutsi extremists and the coup plotters
must be given full assurance from the region that
their attempts to disrupt the peace process will not
be tolerated. Tanzania must also stop any support
for the rebels, even if passively. Only then can
Julius Nyerere's ambition of restoring peace to
Burundi be achieved.
Finally, on an international level, the time has
come for the promises of support to be replaced by
actions. Burundi urgently needs funds to be made
available to support the implementation of the
Arusha Agreement, as well as to enable the
establishment of the institution protection force.
Funds are also needed for the rapid formation of
Commissions, specified by the agreement, for the
reconstruction of the country, the return of
refugees and disaster victims, and the
disarmament, demobilisation, retraining and
rehabilitation of all the fighters. At the same time,
a plan must be implemented to support revenue-
generating activity, in particular by providing the
Burundian Treasury with currency, so that the start
of the transition coincides with a fall in prices and
a significant improvement in purchasing power. In
order to find peace, the international community
must offer the Burundians the means to occupy
themselves with something other than war.
Arusha/Bujumbura/Nairobi/Brussels, 14
August 2001
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